An ESS maximum principle for matrix games.
Previous work has demonstrated that for games defined by differential or difference equations with a continuum of strategies, there exists a G-function, related to individual fitness, that must take on a maximum with respect to a virtual variable v whenever v is one of the vectors in the coalition of vectors which make up the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). This result, called the ESS maximum principle, is quite useful in determining candidates for an ESS. This principle is reformulated here, so that it may be conveniently applied to matrix games. In particular, we define a matrix game to be one in which fitness is expressed in terms of strategy frequencies and a matrix of expected payoffs. It is shown that the G-function in the matrix game setting must again take on a maximum value at all the strategies which make up the ESS coalition vector. The reformulated maximum principle is applicable to both bilinear and nonlinear matrix games. One advantage in employing this principle to solve the traditional bilinear matrix game is that the same G-function is used to find both pure and mixed strategy solutions by simply specifying an appropriate strategy space. Furthermore we show how the theory may be used to solve matrix games which are not in the usual bilinear form. We examine in detail two nonlinear matrix games: the game between relatives and the sex ratio game. In both of these games an ESS solution is determined. These examples not only illustrate the usefulness of this approach to finding solutions to an expanded class of matrix games, but aids in understanding the nature of the ESS as well.
Vincent
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Aerospace and Mechanical Engineering, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721, USA.
Cressman
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R
D005075:Biological Evolution; D005260:Female; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D008297:Male; D008433:Mathematics; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D011157:Population Dynamics; D012744:Sex Ratio