When norms normalize: the case of genetic "enhancement".
As the possibility of genetic intervention becomes more concrete, defining and regulating ethically permissible interventions must include a consideration of the implicit as well as explicit consequences. These include the moral implications of defining "enhancement" by reference to a standard of normality. Some authors have called into question the standard ethical concerns about genetic enhancement, but the distinction between enhancing and therapeutic interventions is still structured as relatively unproblematic. However, determining the boundary between therapy and enhancement will have feedback effects on the socially implemented definitions of what counts as normal in human embodiment. Positioning the interface between permissible and nonpermissible interventions at the same place as the boundaries between therapy and enhancement, and between normal and abnormal embodiment, (1) uses biology to justify a moral evaluation, (2) privileges the single standpoint of the genetically canonical person, and (3) enhances the dichotomy between "normal" and "not normal". Assuming that the limit of permissibility along the interventional continuum is coterminous with the definitions of enhancement and of normality, distracts from the work of uncovering the real grounds to setting limits to genetic manipulation.
Scully
J L
JL
Arbeitsstelle für Bioethik, Institut für Geschichte und Ethik der Medizin, Universität Basel, CH-4056 Basel, Switzerland. scully@bluewin.ch
Rehmann-Sutter
C
C
D004992:Ethics, Medical; D005818:Genetic Engineering / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D024861:Genetic Enhancement; D015316:Genetic Therapy / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D006805:Human Experimentation; D006801:Humans; D013677:Medical Laboratory Science / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*