Dual processes in recognition: does a focus on measurement operations provide a sufficient foundation?
Current theoretical thinking about dual processes in recognition relies heavily on the measurement operations embodied within the process dissociation procedure. We critically evaluate the ability of this procedure to support this theoretical enterprise. We show that there are alternative processes that would produce a rough invariance in familiarity (a key prediction of the dual-processing approach) and that the process dissociation procedure does not have the power to differentiate between these alternative possibilities. We also show that attempts to relate parameters estimated by the process dissociation procedure to subjective reports (remember-know judgments) cannot differentiate between alternative dual-processing models and that there are problems with some of the historical evidence and with obtaining converging evidence. Our conclusion is that more specific theories incorporating ideas about representation and process are required.
Humphreys
M S
MS
The ARC Key Centre for Human Factors and Applied Cognitive Psychology, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia. m.humphreys@humanfactors.uq.edu.au
Dennis
S
S
Chalmers
K A
KA
Finnigan
S
S
D002755:Choice Behavior; D004192:Discrimination, Psychological; D006801:Humans; D011939:Mental Recall; D008960:Models, Psychological; D021641:Recognition, Psychology