Visual indexes, preconceptual objects, and situated vision.
This paper argues that a theory of situated vision, suited for the dual purposes of object recognition and the control of action, will have to provide something more than a system that constructs a conceptual representation from visual stimuli: it will also need to provide a special kind of direct (preconceptual, unmediated) connection between elements of a visual representation and certain elements in the world. Like natural language demonstratives (such as 'this' or 'that') this direct connection allows entities to be referred to without being categorized or conceptualized. Several reasons are given for why we need such a preconceptual mechanism which individuates and keeps track of several individual objects in the world. One is that early vision must pick out and compute the relation among several individual objects while ignoring their properties. Another is that incrementally computing and updating representations of a dynamic scene requires keeping track of token individuals despite changes in their properties or locations. It is then noted that a mechanism meeting these requirements has already been proposed in order to account for a number of disparate empirical phenomena, including subitizing, search-subset selection and multiple object tracking (Pylyshyn et al., Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 48(2) (1994) 260). This mechanism, called a visual index or FINST, is briefly discussed and it is argued that viewing it as performing a demonstrative or preconceptual reference function has far-reaching implications not only for a theory of situated vision, but also for suggesting a new way to look at why the primitive individuation of visual objects, or proto-objects, is so central in computing visual representations. Indexing visual objects is also, according to this view, the primary means for grounding visual concepts and is a potentially fruitful way to look at the problem of visual integration across time and across saccades, as well as to explain how infants' numerical capacity might arise.
Pylyshyn
Z W
ZW
Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, Psychology Building, New Wing, Busch Campus, New Brunswick, NJ 08903, USA. zenon@ruccs.rutgers.edu
D019336:Cognitive Science; D003210:Concept Formation; D006801:Humans; D011582:Psychological Theory; D011597:Psychomotor Performance; D021641:Recognition, Psychology; D014796:Visual Perception