The diagnostic and statistical manual's new white coat and circularity of plausible dysfunctions: response to Wakefield, part 1.
Wakefield has claimed: (1) logical empiricist models of scientific progress support the view that expansions of the modern DSMs are consistent with such standards of progress; (2) diagnostic label proliferation of the modern DSMs is the same phenomenon as change in physical disease labels of the ICDs; (3) the concepts of disorder and dysfunction should not be separated. I show: (1) Wakefield has misrepresented traditional philosophy of science models of progress to serve his rhetorical aims: (2) Wakefield's claim that DSM label proliferation and ICD change are the same is empirically false; (3) failure to separate the concept of disorder from the concept of dysfunction leads to erroneous reasoning and label proliferation observed in the modem DSMs.
Houts
A C
AC
University of Memphis, Department of Psychology, TN 38152-6400, USA. bigfoot.com
D006801:Humans; D001523:Mental Disorders / Q000145:classification / Q000175:diagnosis* / Q000523:psychology; D010684:Philosophy; D011569:Psychiatric Status Rating Scales / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D011594:Psychometrics; D011599:Psychopathology; D015203:Reproducibility of Results; D012586:Science; D012893:Sleep Wake Disorders / Q000145:classification / Q000175:diagnosis / Q000523:psychology