The diagnostic and statistical manual's new white coat and circularity of plausible dysfunctions: response to Wakefield, part 1.
Wakefield has claimed: (1) logical empiricist models of scientific progress support the view that expansions of the modern DSMs are consistent with such standards of progress; (2) diagnostic label proliferation of the modern DSMs is the same phenomenon as change in physical disease labels of the ICDs; (3) the concepts of disorder and dysfunction should not be separated. I show: (1) Wakefield has misrepresented traditional philosophy of science models of progress to serve his rhetorical aims: (2) Wakefield's claim that DSM label proliferation and ICD change are the same is empirically false; (3) failure to separate the concept of disorder from the concept of dysfunction leads to erroneous reasoning and label proliferation observed in the modem DSMs.
University of Memphis, Department of Psychology, TN 38152-6400, USA. bigfoot.com
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D006801:Humans; D001523:Mental Disorders / Q000145:classification / Q000175:diagnosis* / Q000523:psychology; D010684:Philosophy; D011569:Psychiatric Status Rating Scales / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D011594:Psychometrics; D011599:Psychopathology; D015203:Reproducibility of Results; D012586:Science; D012893:Sleep Wake Disorders / Q000145:classification / Q000175:diagnosis / Q000523:psychology