title: Medicine, lies and deceptions.
abstract: This article offers a qualified defence of the view that there is a moral difference between telling lies to one's patients, and deceiving them without lying. However, I take issue with certain arguments offered by Jennifer Jackson in support of the same conclusion. In particular, I challenge her claim that to deny that there is such a moral difference makes sense only within a utilitarian framework, and I cast doubt on the aptness of some of her examples of non-lying deception. But I argue that lies have a greater tendency to damage trust than does non-lying deception, and suggest that since many doctors do believe there is a moral boundary between the two types of deception, encouraging them to violate that boundary may have adverse general effects on their moral sensibilities.
authors: Imperial College School of Medicine, London.
authors: P
authors: P
authors: Benn
mesh_terms: D008192:Deception; D004989:Ethics; D004992:Ethics, Medical; D006801:Humans; D009014:Morals; D010817:Physician-Patient Relations; D035502:Trust; D014342:Truth Disclosure