title: Theory of mind and conceptual change.
abstract: We agree with the commentaries by Scholl and Leslie, and also by Moses, that the meta-analytic findings do not definitively rule out early competence accounts. But they do make extant versions of such accounts increasingly unlikely. In particular, the meta-analytic findings argue against executive function expression accounts, including the Theory-of-Mind Mechanism/Selection Processor account advocated by Scholl and Leslie. Specifically, Scholl and Leslie articulate two explicit predictions of their account: that task manipulations that attenuate inhibitory demands should differentially advantage older children, and that theory-of-mind developments should occur with consistent timetables. Both of these specific predictions are clearly contradicted, not supported, by the meta-analytic findings.
authors.affiliation: Center for Human Growth and Development, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 48109-0406, USA. hmw@umich.edu
authors.forename: H M
authors.initials: HM
authors.lastname: Wellman
authors.forename: D
authors.initials: D
authors.lastname: Cross
mesh_terms: D002648:Child; D002675:Child, Preschool; D003210:Concept Formation; D006801:Humans; D015201:Meta-Analysis as Topic; D010469:Perceptual Distortion; D010553:Personality Development; D011340:Problem Solving; D012938:Social Perception; D014796:Visual Perception