title: [An incentive mechanism for environment management under unsymmetrical information].
abstract: Information unsymmtry is a big obstacle in environment management. In this paper, an incentive mechanism for implementation of effluent charge under unsymmetrical information was designed. This mechanism will provide incentives for true information and lower down the transaction cost in environment management.
authors.affiliation: Department of Environmental Science and Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China. jingfei@inet.tsinghua.edu.cn
authors.forename: J
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Guo
authors.forename: Z
authors.initials: Z
authors.lastname: Zheng
authors.forename: G
authors.initials: G
authors.lastname: Fu
mesh_terms: D004787:Environmental Pollution / Q000517:prevention & control*; D018505:Waste Management