Is there a 'new ethics of abortion'?
This paper argues that the central issue in the abortion debate has not changed since 1967 when the English parliament enacted the Abortion Act. That central issue concerns the moral status of the human fetus. The debate here is not, it is argued, primarily a moral debate, but rather a metaphysical debate and/or a theological debate--though one with massive moral implications. It concerns the nature and attributes that an entity requires to have "full moral standing" or "moral inviolability" including a "right to life". It concerns the question when, in its development from newly fertilised ovum to unequivocally mature, autonomous morally inviolable person does a human being acquire that nature and those attributes, and thus a "right to life". The paper briefly reviews standard answers to these questions, outlining some problems associated with each. Finally there is a brief discussion of one way in which the abortion debate has changed since 1967--notably in the increasingly vociferous claim, especially from disability rights sectors, that abortion on grounds of fetal abnormality implies contempt for and rejection of disabled people--a claim that is rebutted.
Gillon
R
R
Imperial College, London.
D000025:Abortion, Eugenic; D000028:Abortion, Induced / Q000941:ethics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D000029:Abortion, Legal; D001364:Awareness; D033421:Beginning of Human Life; D001921:Brain / Q000196:embryology; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D005260:Female; D005333:Fetus; D006801:Humans; D009014:Morals; D028723:Personhood; D011247:Pregnancy; D006113:United Kingdom; D026712:Value of Life