The right to die: an exercise of informed consent, not an extension of the constitutional right to privacy.
D002961:Civil Rights; D004989:Ethics; D005065:Euthanasia; D033101:Euthanasia, Active, Voluntary; D005066:Euthanasia, Passive; D033161:Government Regulation; D006801:Humans; D007258:Informed Consent; D033222:Judicial Role; D007603:Jurisprudence; D016743:Mental Competency; D018458:Persistent Vegetative State; D019989:Persons with Intellectual Disabilities; D018907:Privacy; D011379:Prognosis; D012297:Right to Die; D012926:Social Control, Formal; D013405:Suicide; D035521:Supreme Court Decisions; D020458:Third-Party Consent; D016312:Treatment Refusal; D014481:United States; D035761:Wedge Argument; D028761:Withholding Treatment
Cruzan v. Harmon; Death and Euthanasia; In re Quinlan; Legal Approach; Professional Patient Relationship; Superintendent v. Saikewicz