Substituted judgment and the terminally-ill incompetent.
D000533:Altruism; D026686:Beneficence; D003657:Decision Making; D028663:Ethical Theory; D004989:Ethics; D005066:Euthanasia, Passive; D005610:Freedom; D006801:Humans; D007206:Individuality; D033222:Judicial Role; D007603:Jurisprudence; D007872:Legal Guardians; D008020:Life Support Care; D016743:Mental Competency; D018458:Persistent Vegetative State; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D028723:Personhood; D019989:Persons with Intellectual Disabilities; D012015:Reference Standards; D012297:Right to Die; D019452:Terminally Ill; D020458:Third-Party Consent; D016312:Treatment Refusal; D028761:Withholding Treatment
Analytical Approach; Death and Euthanasia; In re Eichner; In re Quinlan; In re Storar; Legal Approach; Philosophical Approach; Superintendent v. Saikewicz