title: Financial valuation of incentive arrangements in managed care contracts: a real options approach.
abstract: Managed care provider contracts with risk-based compensation arrangements are similar to derivative securities in that the value of a contract depends on the value of a more fundamental asset: the health plan's investment in the provider's member panel. As such, the financial value of the incentive to avoid investing in the health of the member panel can be modeled using financial engineering techniques.
authors.affiliation: Graduate Program in Health Care Administration, Texas Woman's University, Dallas, USA.
authors.forename: R T
authors.initials: RT
authors.lastname: Maurer
mesh_terms: D003284:Contract Services / Q000191:economics*; D003659:Decision Making, Organizational; D004470:Economics, Medical; D005377:Financial Management, Hospital / Q000379:methods*; D006302:Health Services Research; D008329:Managed Care Programs / Q000191:economics*; D017059:Models, Econometric; D011216:Practice Management, Medical / Q000191:economics; D012052:Reimbursement, Incentive; D020414:Risk Sharing, Financial / Q000191:economics*; D013038:Specialization; D014481:United States