title: Newborn infants and the moral significance of intellectual disabilities.
abstract: This article presents moral philosophical arguments regarding life-saving medical treatment that may be more available to infants without disabilities than to infants with intellectual disabilities. The ideas are that children with disabilities are a burden to their families and to society and that a happy life may not be attainable for these children and their families. I argue that human well-being is not based merely on individual characteristics, but is a result of the individual's relation to other people. Further, children with disabilities are not inevitably a burden to their families or society. Accordingly, intellectual disability is not a sufficient reason for withholding life-saving treatment.
authors.affiliation: University of Jyvaskyla, Finland.
authors.forename: S
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Vehmas
mesh_terms: D019988:Children with Disabilities; D004314:Down Syndrome; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D028601:Euthanasia, Active; D005066:Euthanasia, Passive; D005195:Family Relations; D040821:Human Characteristics; D006801:Humans; D007231:Infant, Newborn; D007237:Infanticide; D008607:Intellectual Disability; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D019989:Persons with Intellectual Disabilities; D011287:Prejudice; D011788:Quality of Life; D040841:Resource Allocation; D012649:Self Concept; D012941:Social Responsibility; D026712:Value of Life