title: Regulatory restrictions on selective contracting: an empirical analysis of "any-willing-provider" regulations.
abstract: "Any-willing-provider" (AWP) laws compel managed care plans to accept any provider willing to accept the plan's terms and conditions, potentially undermining managed care's ability to constrain spending. However. AWP laws potentially respond to inefficient risk-selection by providers of managed care. With risk selection, observed reductions in expenditures in the managed care sector may be offset by increases in the fee-for-service (FFS) sector, with no net decrease. This paper uses panel data on state expenditures to compare per capita spending levels in states with and without AWP laws. The results indicate that expenditures are higher when AWP laws are enacted.
authors.affiliation: Bureau of Economics, United States Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC 20580, USA. mvita@ftc.gov
authors.forename: M G
authors.initials: MG
authors.lastname: Vita
mesh_terms: D003284:Contract Services / Q000191:economics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D018588:Fee-for-Service Plans / Q000191:economics* / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D005102:Health Expenditures / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D006302:Health Services Research; D006801:Humans; D015273:Insurance Selection Bias; D008329:Managed Care Programs / Q000191:economics* / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D017059:Models, Econometric; D020403:Patient Freedom of Choice Laws; D012044:Regression Analysis; D014481:United States