Guidance and justification in particularistic ethics.
This paper argues that, contrary to a common line of criticism followed by scholars such as Helga Kuhse, a particularistic version of virtue ethics properly elaborated, can provide sound moral guidance and a satisfactory account for moral justification of our opinions regarding, for instance, health care practice. In the first part of the paper, three criteria for comparing normative theories with respect to action-guiding power are outlined, and it is argued that the presented particularistic version of virtue ethics actually can provide more guidance than the universalistic theories followed by Kuhse and others. In the second part of the paper it is claimed that universalist normative theories have serious problems accounting for the role that moral principles are supposed to play in the justification, of moral opinions, whereas the present version of virtue ethics accommodates a plausible alternative idea of justification without invoking moral principles or eschewing objectivity.
Kihlbom
U
U
Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University.
D004645:Empathy; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D028663:Ethical Theory; D004993:Ethics, Nursing; D006801:Humans; D028662:Principle-Based Ethics; D028722:Virtues