title: Competition among cooperators: altruism and reciprocity.
abstract: Levine argues that neither self-interest nor altruism explains experimental results in bargaining and public goods games. Subjects' preferences appear also to be sensitive to their opponents' perceived altruism. Sethi and Somanathan provide a general account of reciprocal preferences that survive under evolutionary pressure. Although a wide variety of reciprocal strategies pass this evolutionary test, Sethi and Somanthan conjecture that fewer are likely to survive when reciprocal strategies compete with each other. This paper develops evolutionary agent-based models to test their conjecture in cases where reciprocal preferences can differ in a variety of games. We confirm that reciprocity is necessary but not sufficient for optimal cooperation. We explore the theme of competition among reciprocal cooperators and display three interesting emergent organizations: racing to the "moral high ground," unstable cycles of preference change, and, when we implement reciprocal mechanisms, hierarchies resulting from exploiting fellow cooperators. If reciprocity is a basic mechanism facilitating cooperation, we can expect interaction that evolves around it to be complex, non-optimal, and resistant to change.
authors: Centre for Applied Ethics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2. pad@ethics.ubc.ca
authors: Peter
authors: P
authors: Danielson
mesh_terms: D000533:Altruism; D003198:Computer Simulation; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D004989:Ethics; D006801:Humans; D008960:Models, Psychological