Market reforms and public incentives: finding a balance in the Republic of Macedonia.
The Republic of Macedonia is undertaking sweeping reforms of its health sector. Funded by a World Bank credit, the reforms seek to improve the efficiency and quality of primary health care (PHC) by significantly strengthening the role of the market in health care provision. On the supply-side, one of the key reform proposals is to implement a capitation payment system for PHC physicians. By placing individual physicians on productivity-based contracts, these reforms will effectively marketize all PHC provision. In addition, the Ministry of Health is considering the sale or concessions of public PHC clinics to private groups, indicating the government's commitment to marketization of health care provision. Macedonia is in a unique position to develop a new role for the private sector in PHC provision. The private provision of outpatient care was legalized soon after independence in 1991; private physicians now account for nearly 10% of all physicians and 22% of PHC physicians. If the reforms are fully realized, all PHC physicians-over 40% of all physicians-will be financially responsible for their clinical practices. This study draws on Macedonia's experience with limited development of private outpatient care starting in 1991 and the reform proposals for PHC, finding a network of policies and procedures throughout the health sector that negatively impact private and public sector provision. An assessment of the effects that this greater policy environment has on private sector provision identifies opportunities to strategically enhance the reforms. With respect to established market economies, the study finds justification for a greater role for government intervention in private health markets in transition economies. In addition to micro-level payment incentives and administrative controls, marketization in Central and Eastern Europe requires an examination of insurance contracting procedures, quality assurance practices, public clinic ownership, referral practices, hospital privileges, and capital investment policies.
Nordyke
Robert J
RJ
International Public Policy and Management Program, School of Policy, Planning and Development, University of Southern California, USA. nordyke@usc.edu
Peabody
John W
JW
D030861:Capitalism; D002204:Capitation Fee; D003284:Contract Services; D004465:Economic Competition; D004526:Efficiency; D005061:Europe, Eastern; D018166:Health Care Reform / Q000191:economics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D019981:Health Care Sector / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence / Q000458:organization & administration*; D006801:Humans; D009937:Organizational Objectives; D011057:Politics; D011320:Primary Health Care / Q000191:economics / Q000458:organization & administration*; D017149:Private Sector; D011332:Privatization / Q000191:economics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D017150:Public Sector; D012017:Referral and Consultation; D018843:Republic of North Macedonia