Tests of the power PC theory of causal induction with negative contingencies.
The power PC theory of causal induction (Cheng, 1997) proposes that causal estimates are based on the power p of a potential cause, where p is the contingency between the cause and effect normalized by the base rate of the effect. Previous tests of this theory have concentrated on generative causes that have positive contingencies with their associated outcomes. Here we empirically test this theory in two experiments using preventive causes that have negative contingencies for their outcomes. Contrary to the power PC theory, the results show that causal judgments vary with contingency across conditions of constant power p. This pattern is consistent, however, with several alternative accounts of causal judgment.
Shanks
David R
DR
University College London, UK. d.shanks@ucl.ac.uk
D000328:Adult; D001244:Association; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D007858:Learning; D008297:Male; D015233:Models, Statistical; D015203:Reproducibility of Results; D013598:Systems Theory