Logical implications of applying the principles of population genetics to the interpretation of DNA profiling evidence.
There have been several efforts to codify the approach to interpreting DNA evidence [National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1996; I.W. Evett, B.S. Weir, Interpreting DNA Evidence: Statistical Genetics for Forensic Scientists Sinauer, Sunderland, MA, 1998]. Despite these efforts there are still aspects of ad hoc decision making in modern DNA interpretation. This article discusses some of the remaining areas of concern in this respect. Because of the immense discriminating power of DNA evidence it is unlikely that these concerns would contribute to a miscarriage of justice. They are more likely to lead to lengthy and wasteful debate in court, and to potential appeals. We advocate a previously developed approach to DNA evidence [Sci. Justice 39 (4) (1999) 257; B.S. Weir, in: D.J. Balding, C. Cannings, M. Bishop (Eds.), Handbook of Statistical Genetics, Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics, Wiley, New York, ISBN: 0-471-86094-8, 2001; J. R. Stat. Soc. A 158 (1) (1995) 21] that would give a more solid logical foundation and hopefully lead to sounder and less debatable testimony.
Triggs
Christopher M
CM
University of Auckland, Department of Statistics, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand. triggs@stat.auckland.ac.nz
Buckleton
John S
JS
D016172:DNA Fingerprinting; D005554:Forensic Medicine; D005828:Genetics, Population; D006801:Humans; D007603:Jurisprudence; D016013:Likelihood Functions; D008128:Logic; D015233:Models, Statistical; D011336:Probability