Toward a general theory of persons.
The fundamental question I consider is the following: What is it that makes one thing a person and another thing not? I do not provide a complete answer; rather I begin to develop a framework for answering the question. In this essay I do the following: (1) distinguish between the powers possessed by persons and the constitutions of persons, and propose some metaphysical conjectures concerning the relationship between persons' powers and their constitutions; (2) propose for Christians, as well as for others, an hylomorphic soul-body alternative to Cartesianism; (3) highlight some prominent differences between the nature of human persons to problems in biomedical ethics concerning the ontological and moral status of human embryos and of the comatose.
Howsepian
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University of California, San Franciso--Fresno Medical Education Program, 2615 E. Clinton Avenue, Fresno, CA 93703, USA.
D033421:Beginning of Human Life; D002835:Christianity; D004622:Embryo, Mammalian; D006801:Humans; D018458:Persistent Vegetative State; D028723:Personhood; D010684:Philosophy; D028725:Theology; D014474:Unconsciousness; D015053:Zygote
Bioethics and Professional Ethics; Philosophical Approach; Religious Approach