Group formation games with reappraisal.
The formation of a social group, such as the group of individuals sharing a territory, depends on the interaction between choices made by individuals to stay or disperse. The process can be modelled as a multi-player variant of the well-known War of Attrition in evolutionary game theory, as shown by Blackwell (1997; J. Theor. Biol.189, 175-181). In this paper, we extend the set of strategies defined there by allowing reappraisal during the game. We give a formal analysis of the evolutionarily stable strategy, where one exists, and illustrate it with an example based on badger (Meles meles) territoriality. The results predict that group size will be well adapted to, and very sensitive to, the precise conditions under which the game is played, and give an indication of the potential for parent-offspring conflict.
Department of Probability and Statistics, School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, S3 7RH, U.K. mdp99kw@sheffield.ac.uk
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Walters
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Blackwell
D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D002335:Carnivora / Q000502:physiology; D005716:Game Theory; D008954:Models, Biological; D012919:Social Behavior