title: The impact of financial incentives on physician productivity in medical groups.
abstract: OBJECTIVE
  To estimate the effect of financial incentives in medical groups--both at the level of individual physician and collectively--on individual physician productivity.
  
  
  METHODS
  Secondary data from 1997 on individual physician and group characteristics from two surveys: Medical Group Management Association (MGMA) Physician Compensation and Production Survey and the Cost Survey Area Resource File data on market characteristics, and various sources of state regulatory data.
  
  
  METHODS
  Cross-sectional estimation of individual physician production function models, using ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares regression.
  
  
  METHODS
  Data from respondents completing all items required for the two stages of production function estimation on both MGMA surveys (with RBRVS units as production measure: 102 groups, 2,237 physicians; and with charges as the production measure: 383 groups, 6,129 physicians). The 102 groups with complete data represent 1.8 percent of the 5,725 MGMA member groups.
  
  
  RESULTS
  Individual production-based physician compensation leads to increased productivity, as expected (elasticity = .07, p < .05). The productivity effects of compensation methods based on equal shares of group net income and incentive bonuses are significantly positive (p < .05) and smaller in magnitude. The group-level financial incentive does not appear to be significantly related to physician productivity.
  
  
  CONCLUSIONS
  Individual physician incentives based on own production do increase physician productivity.
authors.affiliation: University of Washington, Department of Health Services, Seattle 98195-7660, USA.
authors.forename: Douglas A
authors.initials: DA
authors.lastname: Conrad
authors.forename: Anne
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Sales
authors.forename: Su-Ying
authors.initials: SY
authors.lastname: Liang
authors.forename: Anoshua
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Chaudhuri
authors.forename: Charles
authors.initials: C
authors.lastname: Maynard
authors.forename: Lisa
authors.initials: L
authors.lastname: Pieper
authors.forename: Laurel
authors.initials: L
authors.lastname: Weinstein
authors.forename: David
authors.initials: D
authors.lastname: Gans
authors.forename: Neill
authors.initials: N
authors.lastname: Piland
mesh_terms: D003430:Cross-Sectional Studies; D003625:Data Collection; D004526:Efficiency; D005249:Fees and Charges; D005260:Female; D006123:Group Practice / Q000191:economics*; D006801:Humans; D016018:Least-Squares Analysis; D008297:Male; D008329:Managed Care Programs / Q000191:economics; D009042:Motivation; D010816:Physician Incentive Plans / Q000191:economics*; D010820:Physicians / Q000191:economics / Q000523:psychology*; D010822:Physicians, Women / Q000191:economics / Q000523:psychology; D012456:Salaries and Fringe Benefits / Q000191:economics*; D012737:Sex Factors; D014481:United States