Naturalistic inquiry and reliabilism: a compatible epistemological grounding.
In this brief analysis, the authors suggest that naturalistic inquiry as a field must return to a more rigorous interpretation of epistemological issues. The need is highlighted by the fact that ideological and methodological claims are increasingly becoming conflated. This produces a distancing of what is truly at stake: a need to defend a genuine epistemological theory consistent with the aims of naturalistic perspectives and establish some ontological commitments as a result. The authors argue that the epistemological theory of process reliabilism is worth examining critically. They also suggest its consistency with the ontological claims of minimal realism.
Miller
Steven I
SI
Department of Leadership, Foundations, and Counseling Psychology, Loyola University Chicago, USA.
Fredericks
Marcel
M
D006801:Humans; D019359:Knowledge; D010686:Philosophy, Medical; D036301:Qualitative Research; D015203:Reproducibility of Results