The welfare effects of illegal immigration.
"This paper extends the work of Ethier on illegal immigration by examining the optimal level of enforcement for the labor-importing country in a two-country model and by considering the effects of allowing capital mobility.  We derive a formula for the optimal level of enforcement against firms that hire illegal workers, and show that the presence of enforcement costs makes the policy less efficient than a wage tax.  With capital mobility, foreign workers gain from an increase in enforcement in the home country because capital is driven out of the home country."
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D003710:Demography; D004467:Economics; D004641:Emigration and Immigration; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D011153:Population; D011157:Population Dynamics; D011640:Public Policy; D012106:Research; D012946:Social Welfare; D014171:Transients and Migrants
Capital; Demographic Factors; Economic Factors; Illegal Migrants; International Migration; Macroeconomic Factors; Migrants; Migration; Migration Policy; Models, Theoretical; Policy; Population; Population Dynamics; Population Policy; Research Methodology; Social Policy; Social Welfare; World