Social norms and illicit behavior: an evolutionary model of compliance.
Economists have viewed the presence of externalities and other market failures as leading to a private equilibrium that would not be Pareto optimal. In the exploitation of common-pool resources, especially biological resources, this would lead to the much-discussed 'tragedy of the commons'. A challenge to this traditional view has emerged from a careful study of the theory and practice of the exploitation of common-pool resources. The existence of a social norm may provide an individual with information on the extent of external costs associated with a behavior, and thus provides an imperfect means of internalizing the external costs. In this paper we propose an evolutionary model of compliance that allows for the existence of a social norm. The impact of the social norm on public policy towards externalities is examined.
Haab
Timothy C
TC
Agricultural, Environmental and Development Economics, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA. haab.1@osu.edu
McConnell
Kenneth E
KE
D000383:Agriculture / Q000191:economics; D003247:Conservation of Natural Resources; D003365:Costs and Cost Analysis; D004777:Environment; D019983:Guideline Adherence; D006801:Humans; D018803:Models, Economic; D012919:Social Behavior