title: Theory skepticism and moral dilemmas.
abstract: Moral-theory skepticism is not an option in any sort of thinking that could actually be used in resolving dilemmas in applied ethics, since its characteristic doctrines entail positions that in practice often will lead to a kind of paralysis in in moral reasoning, where persons faced with having to decide what to do in particularly difficulty cases are unable to rule out the most implausible conclusions. Moral-theory skepticism thus makes it difficult to formulate decision-making procedures that will provide guidance in action, and, so, seems not to succeed as a fully coherent account of moral reasoning.
authors.affiliation: Medgar Evans College, City University of New York, USA.
authors.forename: Gary
authors.initials: G
authors.lastname: Seay
mesh_terms: D002648:Child; D019093:Circumcision, Female / Q000941:ethics; D003054:Cochlear Implants / Q000941:ethics; D018864:Cultural Diversity; D003638:Deafness / Q000523:psychology; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D028781:Ethical Relativism; D028663:Ethical Theory; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D009014:Morals; D033262:Narration