title: Social security in Italy: towards a mixed system?
abstract: We evaluate recent reforms of Italian social security with respect to both the (long) transition and the new steady state, as defined by the notional defined contribution formula. The first is hardly sustainable in the face of the projected sharp increase in the dependency ratio. The second is hardly compatible with a good allocation of risks, given the preponderance of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) component. We believe that further reforms will have to be enacted within PAYG (with a correction to "seniority pensions") and beyond PAYG, with the introduction of an opting-out clause directed at readjusting the relative weights of the two components in households' retirement wealth. The opting-out clause could be combined with TFR (severance pay) diversion, which in itself appears insufficient to realize such an adjustment. Recent government proposals (2001) are briefly discussed.
authors.affiliation: University of Turin, Faculty of Economics, Corso Unione Sovietica, 218 bis, 10134 Torino, Italy. onorato.castellino@unito.it
authors.forename: Onorato
authors.initials: O
authors.lastname: Castellino
authors.forename: Elsa
authors.initials: E
authors.lastname: Fornero
mesh_terms: D000368:Aged; D004651:Employment / Q000191:economics; D005382:Financing, Personal; D006801:Humans; D007182:Income; D007558:Italy; D008875:Middle Aged; D009826:Old Age Assistance; D010415:Pensions; D012179:Retirement / Q000191:economics* / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D012456:Salaries and Fringe Benefits; D012943:Social Security / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*