title: Expensing options solves nothing.
abstract: The use of stock options for executive compensation has become a lightning rod for public anger, and it's easy to see why. Many top executives grew hugely rich on the back of the gains they made on their options, profits they've been able to keep even as the value they were supposed to create disappeared. The supposed scam works like this: Current accounting regulations let companies ignore the cost of option grants on their income statements, so they can award valuable option packages without affecting reported earnings. Not charging the cost of the grants supposedly leads to overstated earnings, which purportedly translate into unrealistically high share prices, permitting top executives to realize big gains when they exercise their options. If an accounting anomaly is the problem, then the solution seems obvious: Write off executive share options against the current year's revenues. The trouble is, Sahlman writes, expensing option grants won't give us a more accurate view of earnings, won't add any information not already included in the financial statements, and won't even lead to equal treatment of different forms of executive pay. Far worse, expensing evades the real issue, which is whether compensation (options and other-wise) does what it's supposed to do--namely, help a company recruit, retain, and provide the right people with appropriate performance incentives. Any performance-based compensation system has the potential to encourage cheating. Only ethical management, sensible governance, adequate internal control systems, and comprehensive disclosure will save the investor from disaster. If, Sahlman warns, we pass laws that require the expensing of options, thinking that's fixed the fundamental flaws in corporate America's accounting, we will have missed a golden opportunity to focus on the much more extensive defects in the present system.
authors.affiliation: Harvard Business School, Boston, USA.
authors.forename: William A
authors.initials: WA
authors.lastname: Sahlman
mesh_terms: D000066:Accounting / Q000379:methods* / Q000592:standards; D000288:Administrative Personnel / Q000191:economics*; D003132:Commerce / Q000191:economics / Q000458:organization & administration*; D030881:Disclosure; D004649:Employee Incentive Plans; D005375:Financial Audit; D006801:Humans; D007449:Investments / Q000191:economics*; D014481:United States