The control of rinderpest in Tanzania between 1997 and 1998.
In January 1997, Tanzania requested international assistance against rinderpest on the grounds that the virus had probably entered the country from southern Kenya. Over the next few months, a variety of attempts were made to determine the extent of the incursion by searching for serological and clinical evidence of the whereabouts of the virus. At the clinical level, these attempts were hampered by the low virulence of the strain, and at the serological level by the lack of a baseline against which contemporary interpretations could be made. Once it became apparent that neither surveillance tool was likely to produce a rapid result, an infected area was declared on common-sense grounds and emergency vaccination was initiated. The vaccination programme had two objectives, firstly to prevent any further entry across the international border, and secondly to contain and if possible eliminate rinderpest from those districts into which it had already entered. On the few occasions that clinical rinderpest was subsequently found, it was always within this provisional infected area. Emergency vaccination campaigns within the infected area ran from January to the end of March 1997 but were halted by the onset of the long rains. At this time, seromonitoring in two districts showed that viral persistence was still theoretically possible and therefore a second round of emergency vaccination was immediately organized. Further seromonitoring then indicated a large number of villages with population antibody prevalences of over 85%. These populations were considered to have been 'immunosterilized'. Although no clinical disease had been observed in them, it was decided to undertake additional vaccination in a group of districts to the south of the infected area. Serosurveillance indicated that rinderpest could have been present in a number of these districts prior to vaccination. Serosurveillance in 1998 suggested that numerous vaccinated animals had probably moved into districts outside the infected and additional vaccination areas, but did not rule out the continued presence of field infection.
Taylor
W P
WP
FAO Consultant, Littlehampton, UK.
Roeder
P L
PL
Rweyemamu
M M
MM
Melewas
J N
JN
Majuva
P
P
Kimaro
R T
RT
Mollel
J N
JN
Mtei
B J
BJ
Wambura
P
P
Anderson
J
J
Rossiter
P B
PB
Kock
R
R
Melengeya
T
T
Van den Ende
R
R
D000818:Animals; D000914:Antibodies, Viral / Q000097:blood*; D002417:Cattle; D002418:Cattle Diseases / Q000097:blood / Q000453:epidemiology / Q000517:prevention & control*; D004196:Disease Outbreaks / Q000662:veterinary; D012301:Rinderpest / Q000097:blood / Q000453:epidemiology / Q000517:prevention & control*; D012302:Rinderpest virus / Q000276:immunology* / Q000472:pathogenicity; D016036:Seroepidemiologic Studies; D013636:Tanzania / Q000453:epidemiology; D014611:Vaccination / Q000662:veterinary*; D014765:Viral Vaccines / Q000276:immunology; D014774:Virulence
D000914:Antibodies, Viral; D014765:Viral Vaccines