title: Hospital market structure and the behavior of not-for-profit hospitals.
abstract: I exploit a change in hospital financial incentives to examine whether the behavior of private not-for-profit hospitals is systematically related to the share of nearby hospitals organized as for-profit firms. My findings demonstrate that not-for-profit hospitals in for-profit intensive areas are significantly more responsive to the change than their counterparts in areas served by few for-profit providers. Differences in financial constraints and other observable factors correlated with for-profit hospital penetration do not explain the heterogeneous response. The findings suggest that not-for-profit hospitals mimic the behavior of private for-profit providers when they actively compete with them.
authors.affiliation: University of Chicago, USA. mduggan@midway.uchicago.edu
authors.forename: Mark
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Duggan
mesh_terms: D002140:California; D004465:Economic Competition; D004469:Economics, Hospital; D019981:Health Care Sector; D006777:Hospitals, Proprietary / Q000191:economics; D006788:Hospitals, Voluntary / Q000191:economics* / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D006801:Humans; D008484:Medicaid; D020444:Reimbursement, Disproportionate Share / Q000191:economics*; D014481:United States