title: Common language or Tower of Babel? On the evolutionary dynamics of signals and their meanings.
abstract: We investigate how the evolution of communication strategies affects signal credibility when there is common interest as well as a conflict between communicating individuals. Taking alarm calls as an example, we show that if the temptation to cheat is low, a single signal is used in the population. If the temptation increases cheaters will erode the credibility of a signal, and an honest mutant using a different signal ('a private code') will be very successful until this, in turn, is cracked by cheaters. In such a system, signal use fluctuates in time and space and hence the meaning of a given signal is not constant. When the temptation to cheat is too large, no honest communication can maintain itself in a Tower of Babel of many signals. We discuss our analysis in the light of the Green Beard mechanism for the evolution of altruism.
authors.affiliation: Institut d'Ecologie, UMR 7625, Université Pierre et Marie Curie, Bât. A, 7ème Etage CC237, 7 quai St Bernard, 75252 Paris Cedex 05, France. mvbaalen@snv.jussieu.fr
authors.forename: Minus
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: van Baalen
authors.forename: Vincent A A
authors.initials: VA
authors.lastname: Jansen
mesh_terms: D000533:Altruism; D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D003220:Conflict, Psychological; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D006801:Humans; D007802:Language; D008954:Models, Biological; D011157:Population Dynamics; D014828:Vocalization, Animal