When wrong predictions provide more support than right ones.
Correct predictions of rare events are normatively more supportive of a theory or hypothesis than correct predictions of common ones. In other words, correct bold predictions provide more support than do correct timid predictions. Are lay hypothesis testers sensitive to the boldness of predictions? Results reported here show that participants were very sensitive to boldness, often finding incorrect bold predictions more supportive than correct timid ones. Participants were willing to tolerate inaccurate predictions only when predictions were bold. This finding was demonstrated in the context of competing forecasters and in the context of competing scientific theories. The results support recent views of human inference that postulate that lay hypothesis testers are sensitive to the rarity of data. Furthermore, a normative (Bayesian) account can explain the present results and provides an alternative interpretation of similar results that have been explained using a purely descriptive model.
McKenzie
Craig R M
CR
Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093-0109, USA. cmckenzie@ucsd.edu
Amin
Marsha B
MB
D000328:Adult; D002755:Choice Behavior; D006801:Humans; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D011337:Probability Learning; D011340:Problem Solving