title: Socially stable territories: the negotiation of space by interacting foragers.
abstract: This article presents a theory of territoriality that integrates optimal foraging and conflict resolution through negotiation. Using a spatially explicit model of a sit-and-wait forager, we show that when resources are scarce, there is a conflict between foragers: there is not enough space for all individuals to have optimal home ranges. We propose that a division of space that solves this conflict over resources is the outcome of a negotiation between foragers. We name this outcome the socially stable territories (SST). Using game theory we show that in a homogenous patch occupied by two interacting foragers, both individuals receive identical energy yields at the socially stable territories; that is, there is economic equity. Economic inequity can arise in a heterogeneous patch or from asymmetries in fighting abilities between the foragers. Opportunity costs play a role in reducing economic inequity. When the asymmetry in fighting abilities is very large, a negotiated division of space is not possible and the forager with lowest fighting ability may be evicted from the habitat patch. A comparison between territories and overlapping home ranges shows that energy yields from territories are generally higher. We discuss why there are instances in which individuals nevertheless overlap home ranges.
authors.affiliation: Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, USA. hpereira@stanfordalumni.org
authors.forename: Henrique M
authors.initials: HM
authors.lastname: Pereira
authors.forename: Aviv
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Bergman
authors.forename: Joan
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Roughgarden
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D003365:Costs and Cost Analysis; D004734:Energy Metabolism; D004777:Environment; D005716:Game Theory; D008954:Models, Biological; D012919:Social Behavior; D013731:Territoriality