Self-selection and moral hazard in Chilean health insurance.
We study the existence of self-selection and moral hazard in the Chilean health insurance industry. Dependent workers must purchase health insurance either from one public or several private insurance providers. For them, we analyze the relationship between health care services utilization and the choice of either private or public insurance. In the case of independent workers, where there is no mandate, we analyze the relationship between utilization and the decision to voluntarily purchase health insurance. The results show self-selection against insurance companies for independent workers, and against public insurance for dependent workers. Moral hazard is negligible in the case of hospitalization, but for medical visits, it is quantitatively important.
Sapelli
Claudio
C
Department of Economics, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Casilla 76, Correo 17, Santiago, Chile. csapelli@faceapuc.cl
Vial
Bernardita
B
D000293:Adolescent; D000328:Adult; D003258:Consumer Behavior / Q000191:economics / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D005191:Family Characteristics; D005260:Female; D006264:Health Benefit Plans, Employee / Q000145:classification / Q000191:economics / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D006296:Health Services / Q000191:economics / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D006301:Health Services Needs and Demand / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D006304:Health Status; D006801:Humans; D015273:Insurance Selection Bias; D008297:Male; D017057:Medically Uninsured / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D008875:Middle Aged; D009313:National Health Programs / Q000191:economics* / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D017149:Private Sector / Q000191:economics*; D016016:Proportional Hazards Models; D017150:Public Sector / Q000191:economics*; D018570:Risk Assessment