title: Models of consistency.
abstract: This article presents a theory of how individuals detect whether descriptions of an entity are consistent or inconsistent. The theory postulates that individuals try to construct a mental model of the entity in which all the propositions are true. If they succeed, they infer that the description is consistent; otherwise, they infer that it is inconsistent. We report three experiments that corroborated the theory. Experiment 1 confirmed that evaluating consistency is easier when an initial model suffices than when reasoners have to find an alternative model. Experiment 2 established the occurrence of illusion, inferences about the properties of entities. Experiment 3 showed that the illusions correspond to mental models of the assertions, even when these models are wrong because they fail to represent what is false.
authors.affiliation: University of Architecture, Venice, Italy.
authors.forename: Paolo
authors.initials: P
authors.lastname: Legrenzi
authors.forename: Vittorio
authors.initials: V
authors.lastname: Girotto
authors.forename: P N
authors.initials: PN
authors.lastname: Johnson-Laird
mesh_terms: D000293:Adolescent; D000328:Adult; D003210:Concept Formation; D003220:Conflict, Psychological; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D008297:Male; D008960:Models, Psychological; D011340:Problem Solving; D011932:Reading; D012660:Semantics