Cloning and identity.
Critics of human cloning allege that the results of the process are likely to suffer from compromised identities making it near impossible for them to live worthwhile lives. This paper uses the account of the metaphysics of personal identity offered by Derek Parfit to investigate and support the claim of identity-compromise. The cloned person may, under certain circumstances, be seen as surviving, to some degree, in the clone. However, I argue that rather than warranting concern, the potential for survival by cloning ought to help protect against the misuse of the technology.
Agar
Nicholas
N
Philosophy Program, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. Nicholas.Agar@vuw.ac.nz
D019976:Cloning, Organism / Q000523:psychology*; D004247:DNA; D026690:Ethics, Clinical; D006801:Humans; D007062:Identification, Psychological; D012649:Self Concept; D014481:United States
D004247:DNA