One or two: an examination of the recent case of the conjoined twins from Malta.
The article questions the assumption that conjoined twins are necessarily two people or persons by employing arguments based on different points of view: non-personal vitalism, the person as a sentient being, the person as an agent, the person as a locus of narrative and valuation, and the person as an embodied mind. Analogies employed from the cases of amputation, multiple personality disorder, abortion, split-brain patients and cloning. The article further questions the assumption that a conjoined twin's natural interest and wish is separation. I first contend that separation is such a radical procedure as to render the post-separation person different from the pre-separation one. Therefore, it is not possible to benefit the pre-separation twin by the act of separation. The article concludes with a critical evaluation of the tendency in bioethics to regard ethical challenges as rivalry between individuals competing for scarce resources.
Barilan
Y Michael
YM
Department of Internal Medicine B, Meir Hospital, Kfar Saba, Israel. bentovia@shani.net
D000028:Abortion, Induced / Q000941:ethics; D001921:Brain / Q000002:abnormalities / Q000601:surgery; D019976:Cloning, Organism / Q000941:ethics; D003243:Consciousness; D009105:Dissociative Identity Disorder; D004992:Ethics, Medical; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D007223:Infant; D007557:Israel; D008319:Malta / Q000208:ethnology; D028723:Personhood; D010686:Philosophy, Medical; D014428:Twins, Conjoined / Q000523:psychology* / Q000601:surgery