Paternalism and egregious harm: Prader-Willi Syndrome and the importance of care.
Paternalism clashes with the usual liberal model. In this paper I argue that attempts to defend even a limited form of paternalism by liberal authors such as Joel Feinberg, Gerald Dworkin and H.L.A. Hart fail. I propose instead a bivalent model for paternalism that appeals to two separate principles: the no-harm principle and the care-principle. The notion of care discussed by contemporary feminist authors is a fundamental moral archetype that permeates history and culture. I go on to consider the case of patients with Prader-Willi Syndrome and argue that paternalism is not only permissible but imperative in cases in egregious harm. This view is enshrined in common law jurisprudence which dismisses consent as a justification in serious crime.
University of Prince Edward Island, Canada.
Louis
L
Groarke
D000328:Adult; D032763:Behavior Control / Q000941:ethics*; D003192:Compulsive Behavior / Q000517:prevention & control*; D019513:Feminism; D005610:Freedom; D006801:Humans; D006963:Hyperphagia / Q000235:genetics / Q000517:prevention & control*; D007258:Informed Consent / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D007603:Jurisprudence; D009765:Obesity / Q000517:prevention & control; D026706:Paternalism / Q000941:ethics*; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D010684:Philosophy; D011057:Politics; D011218:Prader-Willi Syndrome / Q000628:therapy*; D011640:Public Policy; D011781:Quackery / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D012309:Risk-Taking; D012935:Social Justice; D013660:Taxes