title: Realigning incentives in fee-for-service Medicare.
abstract: This paper proposes Medicare payment reform built on the fee-for-service system, with incentive payments to eligible provider organizations determined by their rate of increase in cost per patient compared to the overall growth rate in the community. By planning and monitoring how care patterns are altered to achieve greater efficiency, policy-makers can align the incentives of Medicare and the provider organization better than using either fee-for-service or capitation alone. This reform, unlike capitation, maintains Medicare's historical role as insurer and focuses providers on managing care.
authors.affiliation: Schneider Institute for Health Policy, Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts, USA.
authors.forename: Stanley S
authors.initials: SS
authors.lastname: Wallack
authors.forename: Christopher P
authors.initials: CP
authors.lastname: Tompkins
mesh_terms: D000368:Aged; D018588:Fee-for-Service Plans / Q000191:economics*; D018166:Health Care Reform / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D006801:Humans; D016345:Medicare Part B / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence / Q000458:organization & administration*; D018803:Models, Economic; D012052:Reimbursement, Incentive / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D012306:Risk; D014481:United States