Group interest versus self-interest in smallpox vaccination policy.
The recent threat of bioterrorism has fueled debate on smallpox vaccination policy for the United States. Certain policy proposals call for voluntary mass vaccination; however, if individuals decide whether to vaccinate according to self-interest, the level of herd immunity achieved may differ from what is best for the population as a whole. We present a synthesis of game theory and epidemic modeling that formalizes this conflict between self-interest and group interest and shows that voluntary vaccination is unlikely to reach the group-optimal level. This shortfall results in a substantial increase in expected mortality after an attack.
Bauch
Chris T
CT
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada L8S 4K1. cbauch@uoguelph.ca
Galvani
Alison P
AP
Earn
David J D
DJ
D005716:Game Theory; D006291:Health Policy; D006801:Humans; D032541:Mass Vaccination; D012900:Smallpox Vaccine / Q000008:administration & dosage*; D014481:United States; D014611:Vaccination
D012900:Smallpox Vaccine