In search of counter-examples: deductive rationality in human reasoning.
Dual-process theories come in many forms. They draw on the distinction between associative, heuristic, tacit, intuitive, or implicit processes (System 1) and rule-based, analytic, explicit processes (System 2). We present the results of contextual manipulations that have a bearing on the supposed primacy of System 1 (Stanovich & West, 2000). Experiment 1 showed that people who evaluated logically valid or invalid conditional inferences under a timing constraint (N=56), showed a smaller effect of logical validity than did people who were not placed under a timing constraint (N= 44). Experiment 2 similarly showed that stressing the logical constraint that only inferences that follow necessarily are to be endorsed (N = 36) increased the size of the validity effect, as compared to that of participants (N=33) given the standard instruction to make "logical" inferences. These findings concur with the thesis in dual-processing frameworks that "Rationality-2 processes" (Evans & Over, 1996), "test procedures" (Chater & Oaksford, 1999), or "conclusion validation processes" (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Schroyens, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2001) serve to override the results of System 1 processes.
Schroyens
Walter
W
Department of Psychology, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium. Walter.Schroyens@psy.kuleuven.ac.be
Schaeken
Walter
W
Handley
Simon
S
D000293:Adolescent; D000328:Adult; D001244:Association; D003201:Computers; D003657:Decision Making; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D008128:Logic; D008297:Male; D011582:Psychological Theory; D015203:Reproducibility of Results