Reasoning in bioethics.
It is striking that some arguments in the bioethical literature seem implausible, counterintuitive, and even ridiculous when reported to competent moral agents. When examined, these arguments bear uncanny resemblances to the discourse of patients with debilitating mental disorders. I examine the kinds of irrationality involved, and discuss the fact that such irrationality is worrying in a discipline that purports to serve as a guide for real-life practical reasoning. I offer some thoughts about correctives that we might use to temper some of the odd opinions that bedevil our subject in the name of ethical analysis. It seems that one ought to be suspicious of neatly rational arguments that produce counterintuitive conclusions, but the alternative seems to be that we explore new constructions of old problems in Bioethics such that our discussion of them does justice to what we regard as of fundamental significance to our lives together as human beings.
Gillett
Grant
G
Otago Bioethics Centre, University of Otago Medical School, Dunedin PO Box 913, New Zealand. grant.gillett@stonebow.otago.ac.nz
D001675:Bioethics; D026689:Ethical Analysis / Q000379:methods*; D006801:Humans; D008606:Mental Processes; D028642:Persons with Psychiatric Disorders / Q000523:psychology; D028681:Moral Obligations; D012919:Social Behavior