The dilemma of intellectual property rights for pharmaceuticals: the tension between ensuring access of the poor to medicines and committing to international agreements.
In this paper, we provide an overview of how the outcomes of the Uruguay Round affected the application of pharmaceutical intellectual property rights globally. Second, we explain how specific pharmaceutical policy tools can help developing states mitigate the worst effects of the TRIPS Agreement. Third, we put forward solutions that could be implemented by the World Bank to help overcome the divide between creating private incentives for research and development of innovative medicines and ensuring access of the poor to medicine. Fourth, we evaluate these solutions on the basis of utilitarian considerations and urge that equitable pricing is morally preferable to the other solutions.
Department of Philosophy and Religion, 361 Holmes Hall, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02155-5000, USA. p.illingworth@neu.edu
Jillian Clare
JC
Cohen
Patricia
P
Illingworth
D003906:Developing Countries / Q000191:economics*; D004345:Drug Industry / Q000191:economics* / Q000941:ethics* / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D006297:Health Services Accessibility / Q000191:economics; D006301:Health Services Needs and Demand / Q000191:economics; D018973:Intellectual Property; D038622:Internationality; D007603:Jurisprudence; D010330:Patents as Topic / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D004364:Pharmaceutical Preparations / Q000191:economics*; D012941:Social Responsibility
D004364:Pharmaceutical Preparations