title: Waiting time as a competitive device: an example from general medical practice.
abstract: From a theoretical model we predict that only physicians with quality characteristics perceived as inferior by patients are willing to embark on waiting time reductions. Because of variation in these quality characteristics among physicians, market equilibrium is likely to show a range of waiting times for physician services. This hypothesis is supported by results from a study of Norwegian general practitioners. Since the waiting time offered by a physician influences the number of patient-initiated consultations, a policy implication of our study is that the distinction between patient-initiated and physician-initiated consultations may be less clear-cut than often assumed in the literature.
authors: Health Economics Research Programme, University of Oslo (HERO), Center for Health Administration, Rikshospitalet, N-0027, Oslo. tor.iversen@samfunnsmed.uio.no
authors: Tor
authors: T
authors: Iversen
authors: Hilde
authors: H
authors: Lurås
mesh_terms: D001071:Appointments and Schedules; D002204:Capitation Fee; D004465:Economic Competition; D005194:Family Practice / Q000191:economics / Q000458:organization & administration*; D018588:Fee-for-Service Plans; D005260:Female; D006302:Health Services Research; D006801:Humans; D008297:Male; D017059:Models, Econometric; D009664:Norway; D017060:Patient Satisfaction; D010817:Physician-Patient Relations; D017748:Time Management; D014850:Waiting Lists