The function of phenomenal states: is there progress for the "softer problem" of consciousness?
The function of phenomenal states remains a mystery, primarily because of the prevalent, a priori view that these states serve no functional role. This note is a call to arms against this uncorroborated and counterproductive view, which continues to stifle research on the topic. It is proposed that, given what we know and can accomplish with the tools at hand, discovering the function of phenomenal states has become a tractable problem, easier than that of discovering the neural basis of these states--the "hard problem" of consciousness. A simple method that may unveil the function of phenomenal states is presented. It involves contrasting the task demands of conscious and unconscious processes.
Morsella
Ezequiel
E
Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA. morsella@psych.columbia.edu
D003071:Cognition; D003243:Consciousness / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D011582:Psychological Theory