Competition policy in patent cases and antitrust.
The article that follows examines the competition policy reflected in the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in its patent cases. The court's views on this subject have been manifested most plainly in decisions that have transformed the law concerning infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and claim construction. In both categories, the court narrowed patent scope by reason of its desire to protect competitors. The article argues that the court's premise in prescribing narrower claim scope reflected an incomplete view of competition policy. The court's analysis overlooked the benefits to competition provided by patents, which stimulate inventions and their development. The article traces the development of antitrust jurisprudence and demonstrates how respect for the contribution of patents to competition and skepticism of free-riding has evolved, particularly beginning in the 1970s. The article draws a parallel between the Court's reasoning about competition policy, on the one hand, and the rejected views of Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas and abandoned patent-antitrust jurisprudence, on the other. The Federal Circuit's decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), on the subject of equivalents is considered in the paper. In that decision, the majority adopted a new rule that completely barred infringement under the doctrine of equivalents of any claim limitation where, in prosecution, there had been a narrowing amendment relating to patentability. In the past, prosecution estoppel foreclosing equivalents had been subject to a "flexible bar," which, in some circumstances, allowed for equivalence notwithstanding such an amendment. The article points out that because almost all patents are amended during prosecution, the effect would be to allow widespread copying of patented inventions by trivial modifications of any narrowed claim limitation. The incentive to innovate in the future would be correspondingly diminished and the expectations of past patentees would be correspondingly altered.
Sobel
Gerald
G
Partner Kaye Scholer LLP, New York, New York 10022-3598, USA.
D016363:Antitrust Laws; D049672:History, 19th Century; D049673:History, 20th Century; D010330:Patents as Topic / Q000266:history / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D014481:United States