title: Influence of external information in the minority game.
abstract: The influence of a fixed number of agents with the same fixed behavior on the dynamics of the minority game is studied. Alternatively, the system studied can be considered the minority game with a change in the comfort threshold away from half filling. Agents in the frustrated, nonergodic phase tend to overreact to the information provided by the fixed agents, leading not only to large fluctuations, but to deviations of the average occupancies from their optimal values. Agents that discount their impact on the market, or that use individual strategies reach equilibrium states, which, unlike in the absence of the external information provided by the fixed agents, do not give the highest payoff to the collective.
authors.affiliation: Instituto de Ciencia de Materiales de Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Cantoblanco, E-28049 Madrid, Spain.
authors.forename: M A R
authors.initials: MA
authors.lastname: de Cara
authors.forename: F
authors.initials: F
authors.lastname: Guinea
mesh_terms: D002755:Choice Behavior / Q000145:classification*; D006801:Humans; D008913:Minority Groups / Q000523:psychology / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D011157:Population Dynamics