Why does the species problem still persist?
Despite many years of discussion, the species problem has still not been adequately resolved. Why is this the case? Here I discuss two recent suggested answers to this question that place the blame on the species problem's empirical aspects or on its philosophical aspects. In contrast, I argue that neither of these two faces of the species problem constitute the principal cause of the species problem's persistence. Rather, they are merely symptoms of the real cause: the species problem has not yet gone away because of a failure to recognize that not one but a number of distinct concepts are at the heart of the problem. To illustrate this point, a recently proposed solution to the problem is examined: the suggestion to understand the concept of species as a family resemblance concept.
Philosophy of the Life Sciences group, Institute of Biology, Leiden University, PO Box 9516, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands. reydon@rulsfb.leidenuniv.nl
Thomas A C
TA
Reydon
D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D006801:Humans; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D010802:Phylogeny