Evidence, logic, the rule and the exception in Renaissance law and medicine.
This article sets out to investigate aspects of the uptake of Renaissance law and medicine from some of the logical and natural-philosophical components of the university arts course. Medicine is shown to have a much laxer operative logic than law, reflecting its commitment to the theory of idiosyncrasy as opposed to the demands made upon the law by the need for a uniform application of justice. Symptomatic of the different uptake are the contrasting meanings of "regulariter" and "generaliter" in the two disciplines. Whereas the law treats the rule as inviolable and the exception as only valid if made explicit in due legal form, medicine is able to conceive of a nature as a field of knowledge broader than that encompassed by its rules of art. Both law and medicine approach evidence in ways which reflect their attempts to keep apart the process of information-gathering from that of interpretation; this is exemplified by the legal computation of competing testimony on the one hand and by the various medical modes of sign interpretation on the other.
Maclean
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I
All Souls College, University of Oxford.
D005060:Europe; D049692:History, Early Modern 1451-1600; D007603:Jurisprudence / Q000266:history*; D008511:Medicine; D010684:Philosophy / Q000266:history*