Note on the rationality of rule-based versus exemplar-based processing in human judgment.
This paper reports a study of the relationship between rule- versus exemplar-based processing and criteria for rationality of judgment. Participants made probability judgments in a classification task devised by S. W. Allen and L. R. Brooks (1991). In the exemplar condition, the miscalibration was accounted for by stochastic components of the judgment with a format-dependence effect, implying simultaneous over- and underconfidence depending on the response scale. In the rule condition, there was an overconfidence bias not accounted for by the stochastic components of judgment. In both conditions the participants were additive on average and reasonably transitive, but the larger stochastic component in the exemplar condition produced somewhat larger absolute deviations. The results suggest that exemplar processes are unbiased but more perturbed by stochastic components, while rule-based processes may be more prone to bias.
Juslin
Peter
P
Department of Psychology, Umeå University, Sweden. peter.juslin@psy.umu.se
Olsson
Henrik
H
D000328:Adult; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D007600:Judgment; D008297:Male; D011340:Problem Solving