Typical versus atypical unpacking and superadditive probability judgment.
Probability judgments for packed descriptions of events (e.g., the probability that a businessman does business with a European country) are compared with judgments for unpacked descriptions of the same events (e.g., the probability that a businessman does business with England, France, or some other European country). The prediction that unpacking can decrease probability judgments, derived from the hypothesis that category descriptions are interpreted narrowly in terms of typical instances, is contrasted to the prediction of support theory that unpacking will generally increase judged probabilities (A. Tversky & D. J. Koehler, 1994). The authors varied the typicality of unpacked instances and found no effect of unpacking with typical instances (additivity) and a negative effect with atypical instances (superadditivity). Support theory cannot account for these findings in its current formulation.
Sloman
Steven
S
Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA. steven_sloman@brown.edu
Rottenstreich
Yuval
Y
Wisniewski
Edward
E
Hadjichristidis
Constantinos
C
Fox
Craig R
CR
D006801:Humans; D007600:Judgment; D008960:Models, Psychological; D011336:Probability; D011582:Psychological Theory