title: The effect of a reason's truth-value on the judgment of a fallacious argument.
abstract: Informal reasoning fallacies are arguments that are psychologically persuasive but not valid. In the context of informal reasoning fallacies, the truth-value of the reason in support of a given claim is irrelevant to judging the validity of the argument as a whole. This property stands in sharp contrast with the general role of the reason's truth-value in judging arguments in general. The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that in the context of informal reasoning fallacies the truth-value of a reason influences pupils' judgment of the extent to which the reason supports the claim. The results of the study confirm the research hypothesis.
authors.affiliation: Department of Education, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel. yneumann@bgumail.bgu.ac.il
authors.forename: Yair
authors.initials: Y
authors.lastname: Neuman
authors.forename: Amnon
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Glassner
authors.forename: Michael
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Weinstock
mesh_terms: D000293:Adolescent; D001290:Attitude; D003071:Cognition; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D007600:Judgment; D008297:Male; D011340:Problem Solving; D011795:Surveys and Questionnaires