The Golden Rule and the potentiality principle: future persons and contingent interests.
Duties to future persons are central to numerous key ethical issues including contraception, abortion, genetic selection, treatment of the environment, and population control. Nevertheless, we still seem to be lacking Parfit's 'Theory X', a general theory of beneficence whose appropriateness extends to future generations. Starting from the Golden Rule (TGR), R.M. Hare purportedly derived counterintuitive duties to potential people and 'the potentiality principle'. However, I argue that Hare's derivation involves a hidden and unjustifiable extension from TGR, and show how the most plausible form of TGR is compatible with multiple contradictory principles for the treatment of future persons. I appeal to our own preferences to argue that one extension of TGR follows the spirit of TGR, while the other is deeply implausible. Using the plausible extension, I derive a Contingent Interests Principle (CIP) that offers much promise as Parfit's elusive Theory X. In contrast to Hare's interpretation of TGR, this application provides solid justification for rejecting the potentiality principle.
Chan
Kai M A
KM
Center for Conservation Biology, Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5020, USA. kaichan@stanford.edu
D000028:Abortion, Induced / Q000941:ethics; D026686:Beneficence; D026688:Bioethical Issues; D003247:Conservation of Natural Resources; D003267:Contraception / Q000941:ethics; D006801:Humans; D019369:Life; D028681:Moral Obligations; D028723:Personhood; D010684:Philosophy; D011155:Population Control / Q000941:ethics; D012098:Reproduction / Q000941:ethics*; D018570:Risk Assessment