War of attrition with implicit time cost.
In the game-theoretic model war of attrition, players are subject to an explicit cost proportional to the duration of contests. We construct a model where the time cost is not explicitly given, but instead depends implicitly on the strategies of the whole population. We identify and analyse the underlying mechanisms responsible for the implicit time cost. Each player participates in a series of games, where those prepared to wait longer win with higher certainty but play less frequently. The model is characterized by the ratio of the winner's score to the loser's score, in a single game. The fitness of a player is determined by the accumulated score from the games played during a generation. We derive the stationary distribution of strategies under the replicator dynamics. When the score ratio is high, we find that the stationary distribution is unstable, with respect to both evolutionary and dynamical stability, and the dynamics converge to a limit cycle. When the ratio is low, the dynamics converge to the stationary distribution. For an intermediate interval of the ratio, the distribution is dynamically but not evolutionarily stable. Finally, the implications of our results for previous models based on the war of attrition are discussed.
Eriksson
Anders
A
Department of Physical Resource Theory, Chalmers University of Technology, SE-41296 Göteborg, Sweden. frtae@fy.chalmers.se
Lindgren
Kristian
K
Lundh
T Torbjörn
TT
D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D005716:Game Theory; D011157:Population Dynamics; D013997:Time Factors