A new look at recognition in the Brown-Peterson distractor paradigm: toward the application of new methodology to unsolved problems of recognition memory.
Data from a recognition version of the classic Brown-Peterson short-term memory paradigm was analyzed using a modified version of the conjoint recognition model (Brainerd, Reyna, & Mojardin, 1999), which assumes that recognition is based on either a verbatim comparison of the recognition probe and the target item or a gist comparison of the items. Separate groups of participants were instructed to judge whether the recognition probe was an item from the current trial (exclusion condition), a previous trial (prior-only condition), or either the current or the previous trial (inclusion condition). The concept of gist is commonly thought of as meaning based. Our interpretation of the results suggests that the concept of gist need also emphasize similarity of environmental context. In addition, the results show that priming the recognition probe affects a participant's decision bias but does not enhance or impair the memory traces on which the recognition judgments are based. An additional analysis using Batchelder and Riefer's (1990) source-monitoring model supports the observation that priming affects only decision bias.
Department of Psychology, Hofstra University, Hempstead, New York 11549, USA. psyvrb@hofstra.edu
Vincent R
VR
Brown
David S
DS
Gorfein
D001288:Attention; D003463:Cues; D006801:Humans; D008568:Memory; D011340:Problem Solving; D011930:Reaction Time; D021641:Recognition, Psychology; D014796:Visual Perception