Does the non-identity problem block a class of arguments against cloning?
One class of argument against cloning human beings in the contemporary literature focuses on the bad consequences that will befall the clone or "later-twin." In this paper I consider whether this line of argumentation can be blocked by invoking Parfit's non-identity problem. I canvass two general strategies for solving the non-identity problem: a consequentialist strategy and non-consequentialist, rights based strategy. I argue that while each general strategy offers a plausible solution to the non-identity problem as applied to the cases most frequently discussed in the non-identity problem literature, neither provides a reason for putting aside the non-identity problem when applied to cloning. I conclude (roughly) that the non-identity problem does serve to block this class of argument against cloning.
Green
Richard
R
Weber State University, USA.
D019976:Cloning, Organism / Q000941:ethics*; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D028663:Ethical Theory; D006801:Humans; D007206:Individuality; D014427:Twins / Q000523:psychology; D015974:Wrongful Life