Subjective character of experience in medical ethics: a reply to Atkins.
In a recent issue of this Journal Kim Atkins argued that Thomas Nagel's argument regarding a bat's phenomenal experience is important for understanding the value placed on patient autonomy in medical ethics. In this reply to her paper, I demonstrate that Atkin's argument (a) is based on her misinterpretations of Nagel's argument, and (b) can be established without appealing to such a controversial assumption as that which she makes.
Nagasawa
Yujin
Y
LPO Box 8260, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia. yujin.nagasawa@anu.edu.au
D004645:Empathy; D006353:Heart-Assist Devices / Q000523:psychology; D006801:Humans; D007206:Individuality; D010361:Patients / Q000523:psychology*; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D010684:Philosophy; D012803:Sick Role