title: Rational behavioral response and the transmission of STDs.
abstract: The susceptible-infected (SI) model is extended by allowing for individual optimal choices of self-protective actions against infection, where agents differ with respect to preferences and costs of self-protection. It is shown that a unique endemic equilibrium prevalence exists when the basic reproductive number of a STD is strictly greater than unity, and that the disease-free equilibrium is the unique steady state equilibrium when the basic reproductive number is less than or equal to one. Unlike in models that take individual behavior as given and fixed, the endemic equilibrium prevalence need not vary monotonically with respect to the basic reproductive number. Specifically, with endogenously determined self-protective behavior, a reduction in the basic reproductive number may in fact increase the endemic equilibrium prevalence. The global stability of the endemic steady state is established for the case of a homogeneous population by showing that, for any non-zero initial disease prevalence, there exists an equilibrium path which converges to the endemic steady state.
authors.affiliation: Department of Economics, Wake Forest University, P.O. Box 7505, Winston-Salem, NC 27109-7505, USA. chenfh@wfu.edu
authors.forename: Frederick H
authors.initials: FH
authors.lastname: Chen
mesh_terms: D006801:Humans; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D012725:Sexual Behavior; D012749:Sexually Transmitted Diseases / Q000453:epidemiology*