title: Selective play: choosing partners in an uncertain world.
abstract: The theoretical implications of introducing the "selective play " paradigm to experimental gaming research are discussed. In the traditional "forced play" environment, players are locked in a particular relationship and do not have options of leaving the current relationship and joining another. In the selective play environment players are given the options of leaving the current relationship and forming a new relationship. A previous computer tournament of prisoner's dilemma network (Hayashi, 1993) showed that out-for-tat (OFT) strategy performed very well in the selective play environment. OFT keeps cooperating with a partner until the partner defects; it deserts the partner and turns to someone else as soon as the partner defects. Results of a new computer tournament that introduced opportunity costs, however, point to the limits of the OFT'S strength. OFT prematurely forms a commitment relationship with a cooperative partner and fails to utilize better opportunities. The best performer in the second tournament was the only one who was "trustful" and had a positive bias in calculating the expected payoff of interactions with a "stranger."
authors.affiliation: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.
authors.forename: N
authors.initials: N
authors.lastname: Hayashi
authors.forename: T
authors.initials: T
authors.lastname: Yamagishi