Two neural correlates of consciousness.
Neuroscientists continue to search for "the" neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). In this article, I argue that a framework in which there are at least two distinct NCCs is increasingly making more sense of empirical results than one in which there is a single NCC. I outline the distinction between phenomenal NCC and access NCC, and show how they can be distinguished by experimental approaches, in particular signal-detection theory approaches. Recent findings in cognitive neuroscience provide an empirical case for two different NCCs.
Block
Ned
N
Departments of Philosophy and Psychology, New York University, 100 Washington Square East, New York, NY 10003-6688, USA. ned.block@nyu.edu
D000818:Animals; D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology*; D003243:Consciousness / Q000502:physiology*; D000882:Haplorhini; D006801:Humans; D008959:Models, Neurological; D009039:Motion Perception / Q000502:physiology*; D011582:Psychological Theory; D014793:Visual Cortex / Q000502:physiology*