title: Reciprocal strategies for large groups.
abstract: Reciprocal strategies have been shown to be effective in inducing long-term cooperation in social dilemmas involving small, but not large, groups. In this article, we argue that group-based reciprocal strategies (GBRS)--under which one reciprocates cooperative factions, not individuals, within the group--can induce cooperation in large groups. Results of two computer simulations of 100-member groups show that a GBRS accumulates a significantly larger payoff than do other commonly advocated mixed-motive strategies. A third simulation showed that the size of the cooperative faction is influenced by the nature of the payoff matrix; when there is considerable temptation to defect, one should cooperate only after a large number of others have done so, but if there is little temptation to defect, one should reciprocate the cooperative actions of a smaller faction. We also found that the use of a "win-cooperate, lose-defect" heuristic led to substantial total outcomes. Our results suggest several psychological factors are important in facilitating cooperation, yet need empirical study.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164, USA. parkscd@mail.wsu.edu
authors.forename: C D
authors.initials: CD
authors.lastname: Parks
authors.forename: S S
authors.initials: SS
authors.lastname: Komorita