title: Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity as a function of trust and categorization: the paradox of expected cooperation.
abstract: Two experiments used a 3-choice variation of the prisoner's dilemma game to explore the paradoxical implications of expected cooperation of other groups and individuals for competitiveness and cooperativeness. Experiment 1 found that an experimental manipulation of opponent trustworthiness influenced the tendency of both groups and individuals to cooperate but had no significant effect on the tendency of groups and individuals to compete--possibly because of the perceived unfairness of competing with a trustworthy other. Experiment 2 found that an experimental manipulation of categorization increased the tendency of same-category groups and individuals to cooperate (as in Experiment 1) and also increased the tendency of same-category groups, but not individuals, to compete (unlike in Experiment 1). It was further found that the tendency of same-category groups to compete more than same-category individuals was relatively stronger for participants high in guilt proneness.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3270, USA.
authors.forename: Chester A
authors.initials: CA
authors.lastname: Insko
authors.forename: Jeffrey L
authors.initials: JL
authors.lastname: Kirchner
authors.forename: Brad
authors.initials: B
authors.lastname: Pinter
authors.forename: Jamie
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Efaw
authors.forename: Tim
authors.initials: T
authors.lastname: Wildschut
mesh_terms: D001290:Attitude; D002755:Choice Behavior; D003163:Competitive Behavior; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005260:Female; D006167:Guilt; D006801:Humans; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D008297:Male; D012919:Social Behavior; D012938:Social Perception; D011795:Surveys and Questionnaires