title: Life-extension and the Malthusian Objection.
abstract: Dramatically extending the human lifespan seems increasingly possible. Many bioethicists object that life-extension will have Malthusian consequences as new Methuselahs accumulate, generation by generation. I argue for a Life-Years Response to the Malthusian Objection. If even a minority of each generation chooses life-extension, denying it to them deprives them of many years of extra life, and their total extra life-years are likely to exceed the total life-years of a majority who do not want life-extension. This is a greater harm to those who want extended life than the Malthusian harms to those who refuse extended life, both because losing an extra year of life is worse than enduring a year of Malthusian conditions, and because the would-be Methuselahs have more life-years at stake. Therefore, even if life-extension seems likely to cause severe overcrowding and resource shortages, that threat is not sufficient to justify society in restricting the development or availability of life-extension.
authors.affiliation: East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, USA. jdavies95@utk.edu
authors.forename: John K
authors.initials: JK
authors.lastname: Davis
mesh_terms: D026688:Bioethical Issues; D006806:Human Rights; D006801:Humans; D008017:Life Expectancy; D008136:Longevity / Q000941:ethics; D011157:Population Dynamics; D011640:Public Policy; D019057:Quality-Adjusted Life Years