Does a normal foetus really have a future of value? A reply to Marquis.
The traditional approach to the abortion debate revolves around numerous issues, such as whether the foetus is a person, whether the foetus has rights, and more. Don Marquis suggests that this traditional approach leads to a standoff and that the abortion debate 'requires a different strategy.' Hence his 'future of value' strategy, which is summarized as follows: (1) A normal foetus has a future of value. (2) Depriving a normal foetus of a future of value imposes a misfortune on it. (3) Imposing a misfortune on a normal foetus is prima facie wrong. (4) Therefore, depriving a normal foetus of a future of value is prima facie wrong. (5) Killing a normal foetus deprives it of a future value. (6) Therefore, killing a normal foetus is prima facie wrong. In this paper, I argue that Marquis's strategy is not different since it involves the concept of person--a concept deeply rooted in the traditional approach. Specifically, I argue that futures are valuable insofar as they are not only dominated by goods of consciousness, but are experienced by psychologically continuous persons. Moreover, I argue that his strategy is not sound since premise (1) is false. Specifically, I argue that a normal foetus, at least during the first trimester, is not a person. Thus, during that stage of development it is not capable of experiencing its future as a psychologically continuous person and, hence, it does not have a future of value.
Lovering
Robert P
RP
Department of Philosophy and Religion, American University, Washington, DC 20008, USA. lovering@american.edu
D000028:Abortion, Induced / Q000941:ethics*; D000328:Adult; D003243:Consciousness; D005260:Female; D005333:Fetus; D006708:Homicide / Q000941:ethics; D006801:Humans; D028723:Personhood; D010684:Philosophy; D011247:Pregnancy; D011261:Pregnancy Trimester, First; D012649:Self Concept