Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium.
We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two evolutionarily stable strategies: the efficient one in which the population is in a state with a maximal payoff and the risk-dominant one where players are averse to risk. We show that for a large range of parameters of our dynamics, even if the initial conditions in both habitats are in the basin of attraction of the risk-dominant equilibrium (with respect to the standard replication dynamics without migration), in the long run most individuals play the efficient strategy.
MieKisz
Jacek
J
Institute of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics, Warsaw University, ul. Banacha 2, 02-097 Warsaw, Poland. miekisz@mimuw.edu.pl
Płatkowski
Tadeusz
T
D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D004777:Environment; D005716:Game Theory; D008954:Models, Biological; D011157:Population Dynamics; D012309:Risk-Taking