Individual differences in causal learning and decision making.
In judgment and decision making tasks, people tend to neglect the overall frequency of base-rates when they estimate the probability of an event; this is known as the base-rate fallacy. In causal learning, despite people's accuracy at judging causal strength according to one or other normative model (i.e., Power PC, DeltaP), they tend to misperceive base-rate information (e.g., the cause density effect). The present study investigates the relationship between causal learning and decision making by asking whether people weight base-rate information in the same way when estimating causal strength and when making judgments or inferences about the likelihood of an event. The results suggest that people differ according to the weight they place on base-rate information, but the way individuals do this is consistent across causal and decision making tasks. We interpret the results as reflecting a tendency to differentially weight base-rate information which generalizes to a variety of tasks. Additionally, this study provides evidence that causal learning and decision making share some component processes.
University College London, Department of Psychology, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, England, UK. m.osman@ucl.ac.uk
Magda
M
Osman
David R
DR
Shanks
D003071:Cognition; D003657:Decision Making; D006801:Humans; D007858:Learning; D008568:Memory