title: [Linking behavior in a social dilemma to outcome in another exchange: an experimental study of social dilemma resolution].
abstract: Recent studies have shown that a social dilemma (SD) may be resolved when people base their behavior in it on the outcome in another exchange domain (e.g., Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002). Since people often engage simultaneously in different social exchanges with the same partner, such behavioral linkage, making behavior contingent upon outcome, across different exchange domains may provide an ecologically feasible solution to a SD. In this study, a further analysis of the theoretical statement concerning the positive effect of behavioral linkage was made, and it was argued that such linkage would resolve a SD, since another exchange relationship could provide a means to administer selective incentives. An experiment with 120 participants was conducted to test the hypotheses that people would adjust their behavior in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game depending on their partner's behavior and outcome in another SD, and such behavioral linkage would promote cooperation in the SD. Results of the experiment supported the hypotheses.
authors: Department of Behavioral Science, Faculty of Letters, Hokkaido University, Kita-ku. Sapporo 060 0810, Japan. shinada@lynx.let.hokudai.ac.jp
authors: Mizuho
authors: M
authors: Shinada
mesh_terms: D005260:Female; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D008297:Male