Reputation and the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups.
The evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas has been of considerable concern in various fields such as sociobiology, economics and sociology. It might be that, in the real world, reputation plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation. Recently, studies that have addressed indirect reciprocity have revealed that cooperation can evolve through reputation, even though pairs of individuals interact only a few times. To our knowledge, most indirect reciprocity models have presumed dyadic interaction; no studies have attempted analysis of the evolution of cooperation in large communities where the effect of reputation is included. We investigate the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups in which the reputation of individuals affects the decision-making process. This paper presents the following: (i) cooperation can evolve in a four-person case, (ii) the evolution of cooperation becomes difficult as group size increases, even if the effect of reputation is included, and (iii) three kinds of final social states exist. In medium-sized communities, cooperative species can coexist in a stable manner with betrayal species.
Suzuki
Shinsuke
S
Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Tennoudai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-0006, Japan. suzuki92@sk.tsukuba.ac.jp
Akiyama
Eizo
E
D005075:Biological Evolution; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D006126:Group Processes; D006801:Humans; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D008960:Models, Psychological; D011156:Population Density; D012928:Social Desirability