The cognitive substrate of subjective probability.
The prominent cognitive theories of probability judgment were primarily developed to explain cognitive biases rather than to account for the cognitive processes in probability judgment. In this article the authors compare 3 major theories of the processes and representations in probability judgment: the representativeness heuristic, implemented as prototype similarity, relative likelihood, or evidential support accumulation (ESAM; D. J. Koehler, C. M. White, & R. Grondin, 2003); cue-based relative frequency; and exemplar memory, implemented by probabilities from exemplars (PROBEX; P. Juslin & M. Persson, 2002). Three experiments with different task structures consistently demonstrate that exemplar memory is the best account of the data whereas the results are inconsistent with extant formulations of the representativeness heuristic and cue-based relative frequency.
Nilsson
Håkan
H
Department of Psychology, Uppsala University, SE-751 42 Uppsala, Sweden. hakan.nilsson@psyk.uu.se
Olsson
Henrik
H
Juslin
Peter
P
D000328:Adult; D000465:Algorithms; D001288:Attention; D003071:Cognition; D003463:Cues; D003661:Decision Support Techniques; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D007600:Judgment; D016013:Likelihood Functions; D008297:Male; D008570:Memory, Short-Term; D011939:Mental Recall; D009042:Motivation; D011214:Practice, Psychological; D011337:Probability Learning; D012153:Retention, Psychology; D012718:Set, Psychology