Peter Singer's argument for utilitarianism.
The paper begins by situating Singer within the British meta-ethical tradition. It sets out the main steps in his argument for utilitarianism as the 'default setting' of ethical thought. It argues that Singer's argument depends on a hierarchy of reasons, such that the ethical viewpoint is understood to be an adaptation--an extension--of a fundamental self-interest. It concludes that the argument fails because it is impossible to get from this starting-point in self-interest to his conception of the ethical point of view. The fundamental problem is its mixing the immiscible: the Humean subordination of reason to interest with the Kantian conception of reason as universal and authoritative.
Buckle
Stephen
S
Plunkett Centre for Ethics, School of Philosophy, Australian Catholic University, Strathfield, Australia. s.buckle@plunkett.acu.edu.au
D001315:Australia; D028663:Ethical Theory / Q000266:history; D049673:History, 20th Century; D049674:History, 21st Century; D006801:Humans; D028681:Moral Obligations; D009014:Morals; D012941:Social Responsibility