title: The meaning and computation of causal power: comment on Cheng (1997) and Novick and Cheng (2004).
abstract: D. Hume (1739/1987) argued that causality is not observable. P. W. Cheng (1997) claimed to present "a theoretical solution to the problem of causal induction first posed by Hume more than two and a half centuries ago" (p. 398) in the form of the power PC theory (L. R. Novick & P. W. Cheng, 2004). This theory claims that people's goal in causal induction is to estimate causal powers from observable covariation and outlines how this can be done in specific conditions. The authors first demonstrate that if the necessary assumptions were ever met, causal powers would be self-evident to a reasoner--they are either 0 or 1--making the theory unnecessary. The authors further argue that the assumptions the power PC theory requires to compute causal power are unobtainable in the real world and, furthermore, people are aware that requisite assumptions are violated. Therefore, the authors argue that people do not attempt to compute causal power.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA. christian.luhmann@vanderbilt.edu
authors.forename: Christian C
authors.initials: CC
authors.lastname: Luhmann
authors.forename: Woo-Kyoung
authors.initials: WK
authors.lastname: Ahn
mesh_terms: D003071:Cognition; D006040:Goals; D006801:Humans; D008128:Logic; D008960:Models, Psychological; D011582:Psychological Theory